This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategyproofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness. We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected utility.
Introduction
We consider the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. A (multi-valued) solution is a correspondence which associates with each preference profile a non-empty set of feasible allocations. Our purpose is to study the robustness of multi-valued solutions to strategic manipulations.
A central property on non-manipulability is strategy-proofness, which states that no one can gain by misrepresenting his preferences (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) . In this context, it is known that no efficient single-valued solution is strategy-proof (Green and Laffont, 1977; Holmström, 1979; Schummer, 2000; Ohseto, 2000 Ohseto, , 2004 Svensson and Larsson, 2002) . 1 However, the definition of strategy-proofness is well-defined only for single-valued solutions. Though we do not oppose the desirability of single-valuedness, this property is not weak. In fact, many interesting solutions in this context are defined to be multi-valued. Thus there is room to doubt that the impossibility results come from the underlying assumption of single-valuedness rather than strategy-proofness itself. To examine this problem, we consider extended strategyproofness (henceforth, ESP) axioms that apply to multi-valued solutions as well as single-valued solutions.
There is no single way to extend strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions. Various ESP axioms have been proposed so far in voting environments. 2 The ESP axioms do not have exactly the same appeal as strategy-proofness. For example, they are not always related to dominant strategy implementation unlike strategy-proofness. However, every ESP axiom do shares certain important aspects of strategy-proofness and coincides with strategy-proofness under singlevaluedness. Thus checking the satisfaction of ESP axioms for each solution leads to a better understanding of the robustness of the solution to strategic manipulations.
We prove both positive and negative results. They suggest that perfect non-manipulability is impossible but partial non-manipulability is possible under multi-valuedness. One of the main finding of this paper is that the envy-free solution satisfies an ESP axiom that says that, by misrepresentation of preferences, an agent can add an allocation to the initial set of allocations only if the allocation is worse than all originally chosen allocations. Since the envy-free solution is efficient in our model (Svensson, 1983; Alkan et al., 1991) , this result contrasts with many impossibility results that show the incompatibility between strategy-proofness and some fairness or efficiency notion. On the other hand, the envy-free solution is vulnerable to the manipulation that excludes an undesirable part of the set of chosen allocations. The same possibility and impossibility hold for the efficient and identical preferences lower bound solution. 3 Also, the efficient and egalitarian equivalent solution only satisfies the weakest of our ESP axioms that says that no one can manipulate the solution so that all allocations chosen under manipulation are better than all allocations chosen under the truthful revelation of preferences. 4 Finally, we also prove that no solution mentioned here satisfies an ESP axiom that is based on expected utility on the uniform distribution over a chosen set.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces definitions. Section 3 provides ESP axioms. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 provides discussions. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Definitions
Let N ≡ {1, 2,…, n} be a finite set of agents. There are ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n − 1) units of homogeneous indivisible good, α. 5 For convenience, we consider that any agent who receives no indivisible good receives a "null" good, β. We allow monetary transfers among the agents. An allocation is a pair xuðx i Þ iaN uðrðiÞ; m i Þ iaN uðr; mÞ;
where σ: N → {α, β} is a function such that |σ − 1 (α)| = ℓ and maR N is a vector such that P iaN m i ¼ 0. Here σ(i) is the indivisible object that i receives and m i ≥ 0 (resp. m i b 0) is the amount of money he receives (resp. pays). Let X be the set of allocations. Given σ,
Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation over the indivisible good, v i aR. Then each i's quasi-linear preference over the consumption space fa; bg Â R is represented by, for each m i aR,
A solution is a correspondence from R N to X which associates with each profile vaR N a nonempty set of allocations, ψ(v) ⊆ X. Given two solutions ψ and ϕ, we write ψϕ to denote the intersection of ψ and ϕ. That is, for each vaR N ,
We first define a familiar efficiency solution:
The (Pareto-)efficient solution, P: An allocation x ∈ X is efficient for vaR N if there exists no y ∈ X such that for each i ∈ N, u i ( y i ) ≥ u i (x i ) and for some j ∈ N, u j ( y j ) N u j (x j ). Let P(v) be the set of efficient allocations for v. 3. Extended strategy-proofness
Preliminary
We first define a central non-manipulability axiom that is well-defined only for single-valued solutions. It states that no one can gain by preference misrepresentation:
Strategy-proofness: A solution ψ satisfies strategy-proofness if there exist no vaR N , i ∈ N and v i V aR such that
We shall provide extensions of strategy-proofness so as to be compatible with multi-valuedness. Hereafter we restrict our attention to compact-valued solutions, that is, solutions such that ψ(v) is compact for each vaR N . When we say that a solution ψ satisfies an ESP axiom, the solution is supposed to be compact-valued. This is just to avoid some technical problems such as the lack of maximum or minimum and to simplify definitions of ESP axioms. 6 All standard "fair" solutions studied in this paper and in the literature are compact-valued. 7 To define ESP axioms, it is often useful to consider preferences over sets of allocations. Since we restrict our attention to compact-valued solutions, it suffices to extend preferences to compact sets of allocations. Let X ufAa2 X ⧹fFg : A is compactg be the set of all non-empty compact sets of allocations. For each i ∈ N, we denote by ≻ u i a strict preference on X that is defined by u i . We do not deal with its indifference part, since it is not necessary in order to define ESP axioms.
Minimum and maximum
The following axiom is studied by under the name of "generalized strategyproofness". 8 As he says, this axiom is at the edge of possibility: if it is weakened, the strategyproofness interpretation is lost.
Separation-ESP: Given u i , let ≻ u i s be such that, for each A; BaX ,
A solution ψ satisfies separation-ESP if there exist no vaR N , i ∈ N, and v i V aR such that
The next axiom is based on the maximin criterion. 9
Min-ESP: Given u i , let ≻ u i min be such that, for each A; BaX ,
For example, under the compactness assumption, the maximum and minimum of utilities over the set of consumption bundles exist. Also, the uniform distribution on any compact set of allocations is well-defined. This also enables us to state notation and definitions in a much simpler way. For example, when ψ is compact-valued, we can write "max x∈ψ(v) u i (x) b max y∈ψ(v′) u i ( y)" instead of "for each x ∈ ψ(v), there exists y ∈ ψ(v′) such that u i (x i ) b u i ( y i )". This facilitates the understanding of the discussion since the definitions of ESP axioms are relatively complicated. 7 However, one can handle non compact-valued solutions in a similar way. 8 He shows that this condition is necessary for solutions to be implemented in Nash equilibrium in voting environments. 9 Strategic manipulation based on the maximin criterion is analyzed by Pattanaik (1973) , Dutta (1977) , and Thomson (1979) .
The next condition, which is based on the maximax criterion, is introduced by Jackson (1992). 10 Max-ESP: Given u i , let ≻ u i max be such that, for each A; BaX ,
No addition and deletion
Ching and Zhou (2002) introduce two ESP axioms, each of which implies max-ESP and min-ESP, respectively. They call the pair of the two axioms "strategy-proofness". The first one states that if an allocation that was not originally chosen is chosen following an agent's misrepresentation, then the allocation is worse than all originally chosen allocations for the agent. The second one states that if an allocation that was originally chosen is not chosen following an agent's misrepresentation, then the allocation is better than all allocations chosen under the manipulation.
No-addition-ESP:
Any ψ satisfying no-addition-ESP is robust to the strategic enlargement of the set of chosen allocations. We say that an agent i can enlargement-manipulate ψ at vaR N if there exists
If ψ satisfies no-addition-ESP, then there are no i ∈ N and vaR N such that i can enlargementmanipulate ψ at v.
No-deletion-ESP:
Any ψ satisfying no-deletion-ESP is robust to the strategic reduction of the set of chosen allocations. We say that an agent
If ψ satisfies no-deletion-ESP, then there are no i ∈ N and iaR N such that i can reductionmanipulate ψ at v.
Expected utility
Given vaR N , since ψ(v) is the set of best allocations in views of ψ, whenever ψ is applied, it is natural to consider that all allocations in ψ(v) are equally desirable. Then it makes sense to use the uniform distribution over ψ(v) to select one final allocation from this set. This idea justifies the following ESP axiom for the case when agents evaluate sets of allocations by expected utility: 11
Expected-utility-ESP: Given u i and AaX , let Eðu i : AÞ be the expected utility of u i at A with respect to the uniform distribution f over A, i.e.Þ,
Since expected-utility-ESP only depends on the average of utilities over allocations, it implies none of the ESP axioms defined so far except for separation-ESP. Expected-utility-ESP is introduced by Feldman (1979a Feldman ( , 1980 in voting environments. 12 Feldman (1979a Feldman ( , 1980 and Barberà, Dutta, and Sen (2001) study this axiom and obtain certain dictatorship results in voting environments. Gärdenfors (1979) analyzes relations between preferences on sets and expected utility functions when distributions over the set of chosen allocations are unknown.
Lemma 1. The following relations hold for ESP axioms:
Manipulability of fair solutions

Envy-freeness
A central fairness concept in the theory of fair allocation is envy-freeness (Foley, 1967) . It states that everyone should weakly prefer his own consumption bundle to anyone else's at any chosen allocation.
The envy-free solution, F: An allocation x ∈ X is envy-free for vaR N if for each i, j ∈ N, u i (x i ) ≥ u i (x j ). Let F(v) be the set of envy-free allocations for v.
It is known that for each vaR N , F(v) ≠ ∅ (Alkan et al., 1991, Theorem 2). 13 In this context, all envy-free allocations are efficient (Svensson, 1983, Theorem 2) . This relation much strengthens the appeal of the envy-free solution. The next lemma is useful to understand the structure of this solution:
11 Note that the uniform distribution on ψ(v) is well-defined since this set is compact. 12 Definition 7 in Feldman (1979a) and "non-manipulability" in Feldman (1980) correspond to this. 13 In our simpler setting, the existence of envy-free allocations can be derived as a corollary to our Lemma 2. 
This lemma implies that the best envy-free allocation for i with
. This fact suggests that no agent who receives α can manipulate the envy-free solution in such a way that his best envy-free allocation is improved. Also, it suggests that enlarging the set of envy-free allocations in a favored way is impossible.
Proposition 1. F satisfies no-addition-ESP.
Proof. Let vaR N . We only consider the simple case that v has no tie: for each i, j ∈ N, v i ≠ v j . The case with tie can be handled in the same way as non-tie cases, but only dealing with the non-tie case suffices to understand the essence of the proof.
Without loss of generality, assume that
The other case can be handled in a parallel way. Let v j ′ ≠ v j . Note that and min xaFðvÞ u j ðx j Þz S n v n−S þ1 .
we obtain the desired result.
Hence, max
The same argument as (i-iii) holds, so we omit the proof.
The same argument as (i-iv) holds, so we omit the proof. □ Proposition 1 contrasts with many impossibility results in this literature. In particular, it is known that, when there are two agents, the class of single-valued and strategy-proof solutions can be characterized by certain forms of constancy or dictatorship (Schummer, 2000 , Theorem 1). 14 Also, when there is only one real object, even on finitely restricted domains, there is no singlevalued subsolution of the efficient solution satisfying strategy-proofness and equal compensation (Ohseto, 2000, Theorem 1) . 15 The envy-free solution is a subsolution of the efficient solution that satisfies equal compensation and do not exhibit any constancy or dictatorship. Hence, our theorem implies that we can somewhat escape Schummer and Ohseto's impossibility results if we allow solutions to be multi-valued and extend strategy-proofness to no-addition-ESP. However, the envy-free solution escapes some but not all form of manipulation: the next proposition is negative and shows that the envy-free solution is almost always vulnerable to reduction-manipulation. 
Identical preferences lower bound
The notion of the identical preferences lower bound states that everyone should benefit from the diversity of preferences (Moulin, 1990) . Given v i aR, let r(v i ) ∈ X be such that for each j ∈ N, u i (r i (v i )) = u i (r j (v i )). This is an allocation that treats everyone symmetrically when all agents have the same preference as i. Note that such an r(v i ) is essentially unique in that if r(v i ) and r′(v i ) are two such reference allocations, u i (r i (v i )) = u i (r i ′(v i )). Slightly abusing notation, we deal with r(v i ) as if it were a consumption bundle.
Identical preferences lower bound solution, B:
It is known that if n = 2, then F = B, and if n N 2, then F ⊊ B (Moulin, 1990, p152; Beviá, 1996 , Propositions 1 and 2). The following is a characterization of reference bundles for the identical preferences' lower bound.
Lemma 3. For each v i aR N ; r(v i )¼(a; − n−S n v i ) (or, alternately, (b; S n v i )). Proof. Since the set of symmetric allocations for (v i , v i ,…, v i ) coincides with the set of envy-free allocations F (v i , v i ,…, v i ), this immediately follows from Lemma 2. □ Lemma 3 implies the following characterizations of PB i (v): Then, for each i ∈ N, ; ;
is the union of the two sets in (i) and (ii).
We provide a slightly weaker version of no-addition-ESP. It states that, at every true preference profile, when an agent manipulates a solution, the welfare level he achieves is lower than all achievable welfare levels under the true preference profile.
Weak no-addition-ESP: There are no vaR N , i ∈ N, and v i V aR such that for some y
Note that in the definition of no-addition-ESP, the term "u i ðy i Þgfu i ðz i ÞaR : zawðvÞg" does not appear. This is the only difference between no-addition-ESP and weak no-addition-ESP. However, since agents are only concerned with welfare levels, we consider that this relaxation does not lose the essence of no-addition-ESP.
Proposition 3. If n = 2, then PB satisfies no-addition-ESP. If n ≥ 3, then PB does not satisfy noaddition-ESP, but it satisfies weak no-addition-ESP.
Proof. If n = 2, PB coincides with F (Beviá, 1996, Proposition 1), hence by Proposition 1, F satisfies no-addition-ESP.
Assume n ≥ 3. Since l b n, at least one of l ≥ 2 or n − ℓ ≥ 2 holds. We only prove the case ℓ ≥ 2. The other case can be proved in a parallel way.
Let 
Since y ∉ PB(v), it suffices to show that u 1 (x 1 ) b u 1 (y 1 ). One can easily see that
Since ℓ ≥ 2, 1 2 V S −1 S . This and S n bn−S together imply the third inequality of Eq. (1). Thus u 1 (x 1 ) b u 1 (y 1 ) holds.
For the second part of the claim, we only show that in the above counterexample, there exists z 1 ∈ PB 1 (v) such that u 1 (z 1 ) = u 1 (y 1 ), so the existence of y 1 does not lead to the violation of weak no-addition-ESP. A formal proof can be easily obtained by applying the same argument, so we omit it. Agent 1's best allocation among the set PB 1 (v) is w ∈ PB 1 (v) with w 1 ¼ a; ðS −1Þ n−S n À Á . By a routine calculation, u 1 (y 1 ) b u 1 (w 1 ). Thus, u 1 (x 1 ) b u 1 (y 1 ) b u 1 (w 1 ). Hence, there exists m 1 V a − n−S n S 2n ; ðS −1Þ n−S n À Á such that u 1 (y 1 ) = u 1 (α, m 1 ′). Since z 1 ≡ (α, m 1 ′) ∈ PB 1 (v), this completes the proof. □ It is easy to see that, if ψ satisfies weak no-addition-ESP, then it is enlargement-nonmanipulable at all vaR N . Thus Proposition 3 implies that PB satisfies this non-manipulability condition. On the other hand, for reduction-manipulation, the same impossibility as F holds: Claim 1. For each iV ℓ ; Eð ðu i : ψ ψð ðvÞ ÞÞ Þ≥1. Let i ≤ ℓ. Note v i = 1. It suffices to show that for arbitrary small ε N 0,
Let ε N 0 and v i ′ ≡ ε.
By expected-utility-ESP,
By definition,
We claim that
Since
Since Eq. (8) holds for arbitrary chosen x′ ∈ ψ(v i ′, v − i ), we have Eq. (5). Thus, by Eqs.
(3), (4), and (5), we have Eq. (2). Since Eq. (2) was proven for arbitrary small ε N 0, the claim is now established.
Claim 2. Some i ≥ ℓ + 1 can manipulate. Note that, when f is the uniform distribution on ψ(v),
Therefore, by Claim 1, there exists i ≥ ℓ + 1 such that Eðu i : wðvÞÞV0. We claim that i can manipulate ψ at v.
This contradicts expected-utility-ESP. □ Since F ⊆ PB, Proposition 5 implies that no ψ ⊆ F satisfies expected-utility-ESP.
Egalitarian equivalence
The notion of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) states that each agent should receive a consumption bundle that is indifferent to a common "reference" consumption bundle. Given vaR N , an allocation x is α-egalitarian equivalent for v if there exists m ⁎ a aR such that for each i ∈ N, u i (x i ) = u i (α, m α * ). Let E α (v) be the set of α-egalitarian equivalent allocations for v. Similarly, x is β-egalitarian equivalent for v if there exists m ⁎ b aR such that for each i ∈ N, u i (x i ) = u i (α, m α * ). Let E α (v) be the set of β-egalitarian equivalent allocations for v.
Egalitarian-equivalent solution, E: For each vaR N , let E(v) ≡ E α (v) ⋃ E β (v) be the set of egalitarian equivalent allocations.
The following is a characterization of the set of α-egalitarian-equivalent allocations:
for each iaN a ðrÞ;
vj n for each iaN b ðrÞ:
Proof. We only prove the only if part, since the other part is straightforward. Let (σ, m) ∈ E α (v). Without loss of generality, assume that N β (σ) = {1, 2,…, n − ℓ}. Since (σ, m) ∈ E α (v), all agents in N α (σ) receive the same amount of money, caR.
This lemma implies that any α-egalitarian equivalent allocation is characterized by valuations of agents who receive β. Thus, whenever the set N β (σ) is unchanged, any agent i ∈ N β (σ) can increase his money by reporting v i ′ N v i . This fact underlines the main difficulty with egalitarianequivalent solutions concerning the satisfaction of ESP axioms.
Since α-egalitarian equivalence and β-egalitarian equivalence are symmetric, the characterization of β-egalitarian equivalent allocations is also obtained in a similar fashion: Proof. We only show that PE satisfies separation-ESP, since other proofs are easy. Let vaR N , i ∈ N, and v i ′ ≠ v i . We assume that v i ≥ v. The other case can be proven in a parallel way. Note that
Let x ≡ (σ, m) be the efficient and α-egalitarian equivalent allocation for v with σ(i) = α. Note that x ∈ PE(v). We shall show that there is y
. Let y ≡ (σ′, m′) be the efficient and α-egalitarian equivalent allocation for v′ with
Note that y ∈ PE(v′).
One can easily see that
Hence, u i (x i ) N u i (y i ). □ The only positive result we obtained is that PE satisfies separation-ESP, which is the weakest extension of strategy-proofness. Thus Proposition 6 is rather negative.
Discussion
Other ESP axioms
There are many other ESP axioms in the literature. We refer to Gärdenfors (1979 ), Feldman (1979a , and Klaus and Storcken (2002) for the interested reader. We here only mention an ESP axiom whose flavor is quite different from ours. The axiom is studied by Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) in economies with indivisibilities. It states that there exists no vaR N such that for each x ∈ ψ(v), there exist some i ∈ N and v i V aR for which
Let us call this axiom point-wise-ESP. In the definition of point-wise-ESP, manipulation is considered for each point in ψ(v) and manipulators can be different at every point. Thus, the idea of point-wise-ESP is based on the manipulation of an allocation in a chosen set rather than the set itself, unlike our ESP axioms. Tadenuma and Thomson (1995, Theorem 1) show that, when there is only one indivisible good, no ψ ⊆ F satisfies point-wise-ESP. By a proof similar to the proof of Proposition 5, one can easily show that no ψ ⊆ PB satisfies point-wise-ESP. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's result by allowing several indivisible objects to exist and extending F to PB.
Stochastic choice
In voting environments, Gibbard (1977) considers single-valued solutions that select a probability distribution over the set of alternatives. 17 This stochastic approach is quite different from our approach that selects a set of deterministic alternatives (allocations). However, when we compare sets taking into account probability distributions, there is no big difference between the two. We here restrict our attention to uniform distributions. 18 Let F uf f : aAaX ; f is the uniform distribution over Ag be the set of uniform distributions whose supports belong to X . Given f aF , let supp f ufxa X : f ðxÞN0g
be the support of f. A stochastic solution is a function h from R N to F . We assume that each agent evaluates every f aF by expected utility. A stochastic solution is stochastically strategy-proof if there exist no vaR N , i ∈ N, and v i ′ such that, when f ≡ h(v) and
Given a stochastic solution h, define the solution w h : R N YX as ψ h (v) ≡ supph(v) for each vaR N . Then it is easy to see that ψ h satisfies expected-utility-ESP if and only if h satisfies stochastic strategy-proofness. Therefore, Proposition 5 implies that there exists no stochastic solution h that satisfies stochastic strategy-proofness, "ex-post efficiency" ( 8vaR N , supph (v) ⊆ P(v)), and the "ex-post identical preferences lower bound" ( 8vaR N , supph(v) ⊆ B(v)). 19 ESP. However, it is open if these solutions are implementable in undominated strategies using "bounded mechanism".
Summary of results
The next table summarizes which main solutions satisfy which ESP axioms: 
Conclusion
We studied strategic manipulations of (multi-valued) solutions in economies with homogeneous indivisible objects and monetary transfers. By examining the satisfaction of ESP axioms, we investigated how strategically manipulable solutions are and which types of manipulations occur. For example, we showed that the envy-free solution is robust to the manipulation that adds a better allocation to the set of chosen allocations, but it is vulnerable to the manipulation that deletes a worse allocation from the set of chosen allocations. Providing both positive and negative results is important here, since understanding what is behind a positive result passes through what cannot be done. This also enables us to compare the degree of manipulation across solutions. For instance, given our results, it is fair to say that the egalitarian-equivalent solution is more manipulable than the envy-free solution.
